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1 Introduction
The area of public expenditure and fiscal policy in developing countries is a vast and
complex subject to study. Although we are dealing with national budgeting and sectoral
revenue and expenditure, there remains the social aspect of policies, eventually some
will be gainers and some losers in the process.
This paper discusses the possibilities and threats of using a sector investment
programmes as a part of national development strategy. National budgeting is a
complex issue in developing countries. Revenue collection is problematic since taxation
systems are often ineffective. Donor funds are attractive, but at the same time difficult
to administrate. From the perspective of this paper, the sector investment programmes
offer a unified approach to donor aid administration. However, the problem is to
integrate the sectors' needs with national budgeting. This becomes even more difficult
when the government operates on a cash budget with limited flexibility in the timing
and allocation of expenditure.
The ways to allocate public spending are numerous, yet the available resources are
scarce. In determining how the public expenditure should be allocated, one can
distinguish between expenditure on non-productive and productive sectors. The
rationale for investments in productive sectors is that the resulting economic growth is
increasing the overall wealth. This argument is often challenged with the view that
wealth accumulates to few and the overall impact is hardly a decline in poverty.
Investments in non-productive sectors, on the other hand, are likely to create social
safety nets and other means to reduce inequality. Sector investment programmes (SIPs),
sectoral development programmes (SDPs) or sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) all refer
to a concept designed to take into consideration the needs of a particular sector as a
whole. Strategic planning, budgeting and aid administration follow a national scheme to
support the sectors' development. Relevant terminology for sector investments includes:
· Basket funding is the ideal case of a sector investment programme. This means
that all donors contribute to a single fund which is administrated by the
recipient government.
· Sector strategy means defining national priorities and targets of a given sector.
Usually this is done most effectively using bottom up strategy. This means that
each district level office will prioritize development needs of the district, these
individual reports are combined at the province level office and finally
delivered to the Ministry at the national level.
· Aid ownership means taking responsibility of the aid received. This also means
that donor aid must be 'consistent with' government policy (Noonan 1997). In
the long run, it should be made national priority to reduce the need for
technical assistance and increase the local capacity to manage the aid
administration and processing of the funds2
The consequences of poor implementation of a sector programme are illustrated using
evidence from the agricultural sector investment programme (ASIP) in Zambia.1 Of the
productive sectors, agricultural production has a special role. This is because it has very
close direct linkages to rural household income, which is not observed in the input-
output analysis. This is because of the weak linkages with other sectors of production.
However, using social accounting matrices, an extension to input-output models, to
capture the linkages between production and household income can highlight the
importance of agricultural sector. In this paper, a social accounting matrix for Zambia2
is utilized to carry out scenarios of alternative ways to allocate funds within the
agricultural sector.
This paper is organized in the following way. First, in section 2 the current situation of
sector investment programmes is described. In section 3 the fiscal policy aspects of
sector programmes are discussed. In section 4, a brief introduction to case study of
ASIP in Zambia is given using historical data from country's agricultural production.
Section 5 presents policy simulations from the programme implementation and section
6 provides some conclusions from the paper.
2 State of the art of sector investment programmes
Sector investment programmes can be defined as a joint donor and government effort to
allocate available scarce financial resources according to nationally defined targets and
projects. However, the programme should be flexible to take into consideration any
relevant changes within the economy as opposed to fixed long-term expenditure plan.
This section provides some of the basic ideas of the sector investments and their status
in Africa. In the second part of this section, more practical issues are dealt with.
Sector investment programmes can take place on various sectors, including health and
education, infrastructure and energy. However, there are issues which are common in
these sectors, namely their historically low levels of public expenditure. As an integral
part of a sector investment programme, the governments have been obliged to commit
funding in addition to donor contributions. This has led to more careful public
expenditure considerations and commitment.
World Bank (Harrold 1995: xi-xii) has defined sector investment programmes to have
the following qualities:
· programmes are sector-wide in scope and cover both current and capital
expenditures
· they are based on clear sector strategy and policy framework
· the responsibility of the programme is on local authorities
1 A more in-depth analysis of ASIP can be found in Nokkala (2001).
2 The social accounting matrix used is based on Adam and Bevan (1998).3
· all donors agree on the ideology and financing of the sector investment
programme
· wherever possible, all practices under the programme should be common
· local activity should be increased and technical assistance reduced in the
programme administration
Traditionally, development aid has been based on project support. This approach has
many advantages. First, it has kept aid expenditure under donors' control. The
monitoring and evaluation framework has been relatively simple to organize. Second,
earmarking has made it possible to justify the expenditure, for instance in Finland the
Parliament approves the annual development expenditure. Third, project aid has made it
possible to provide technical assistance and supplies using domestic enterprises to
produce the services. This has meant that the aid expenditure has remained in the donor
country, providing employment etc.
The World Bank has promoted the sector programmes, launching them at a relatively
rapid speed. It has produced documentation for guidance, arranged working groups and
additional consultancy to promote the planning and implementation of sector
programmes. This quick progress has had its opponents as well. First of all, the speed of
the reforms has left the recipient governments little time to prepare its organization for a
sector-wide approach. At the same time, the process of formulating programmes has
been fast and has perhaps not touched all the relevant issues. For instance, in the case of
education sector investments, in some cases groups such as rural girls and disabled
children were left out of a sector programme. The situation was improved in a revision
of the programme, but this illustrates how a careful research on the sectors' problems
was missing in the planning stages.
According to World Bank (Jones 1997), five critical points in the project based aid can
be distinguished:
· The recipient countries lack responsibility in donor-driven projects
· Aid is often allocated to other targets than originally agreed upon
· Successful projects do not contribute to sectoral development
· Implementation of the projects is often weak
· The large number of individual projects uses up administrative resources
Most of the current sector programmes focus on social sectors, health and education.
The rationale for this is that these sectors are lagging behind in development and it is
considered easier to receive funds to these activities rather than to production. In
developing countries, expenditure on social sectors has taken only a small portion of
total government expenditure and even a relatively smaller share of the GDP.
Foster (2000) listed a total of 78 sector programmes in progress in 2000. In 1994, there
were only two programmes running, in 1996 a total of 19 programmes were running4
(Cleaver 1997). The division by sectors shows that 47 out of 78 programmes focused on
social sectors, 3 focused on environment, 20 focused on infrastructure and energy and
10 focused on agriculture (Table 1).
Some countries have argued that more stress should be placed on sector investments on
productive sectors. In many countries the small and medium-sized industry
development could be emphasized as a sector investment programme. There are many
practical reasons why the programmes focus on areas such as social sectors and
agriculture. Many donor countries face domestic problems with unemployment in the
industrial sectors and it can be difficult to promote industries in a developing country
when domestic problems also exist. In the long run, it also seems that promoting these
industries could increase their international competitiveness and create more problems
to donor country producers.
Despite the large number of programmes, the overall performance level has been low.
In some cases, the concept of a sector investment programme has been used to create
partial solutions. In Zambia, there are two sector programmes on education: basic
education and technical and vocational training. The reason for this has been that
altogether four different Ministries have responsibilities of providing education services
and because of the political importance of aid disbursements the original education
sector investment programme was divided into two programmes. Even this choice of
two separate programmes has not solved all the practical problems in implementation
(Nokkala 1998).
An important question in the African context is the political economy of aid. In the
traditional sense, money has equalled power and the situation may not have improved
considerably. Sector investments mean large lump sum investments and increased
importance of the responsible institutions and persons. This creates pressures to allocate
disbursements not only by curriculum importance but also by political importance.
Examples from previous aid administration cases, for instance in Ethiopia, have shown
that agricultural expenditure can be used as a political tool. For instance, regional
disparities in the disbursements can appear due to the Ministers' own background.
Table 1
Sector programmes by sector and region (Foster 2000, 9)
SPs Agri Educ Energy Env Health Transp Urban Water
West Africa 32 4 8 10 8 1 1
East Africa 15 2 3 1 1 4 3 1
Southern Africa 20 4 3 2 2 5 2 2
Asia 9 6 3
Latin America 2 2
Total 78 10 22 3 3 22 13 2 25
The political influence of the sector investments is not simply about the dialogue
between different ministries. The targeting of donor driven investments creates also a
powerful political tool. Again, the examples from Ethiopia have shown that the political
elite of ethnical minority has targeted expenditure to minority areas, leaving the rest of
the country with less resources. This has been especially problematic, since most of the
expenditure has been provided in the areas where the standard of living already has
exceeded the national average. These policies have not promoted a more equal
distribution of income, in contrast they have created more biased growth.
It can be argued that some of these problems could be overcome by using the Ministry
of Finance as a channel for disbursements. It is true that this arrangement would
decrease the role of sector Ministries but at the same time it would increase the power of
the Ministry of Finance. In many countries, this would mean that the Prime Minister
could become less important in the political hierarchy. In Zambia, the Minister of
Agriculture has changed a number of times during the ASIP planning process, perhaps
indicating that the political leadership of the programme has remained elsewhere.
3 Sector investments and public expenditure management
The sector investments, from the practical point of view, relate to a number of critical
areas where the success or failure of a given programme is measured. These areas
include monitoring and evaluation practices, financing and the capacity building within
the implementing organization. It has often been the case that the programme
formulation in terms of the strategically important targets has been more important than
focusing on the practical issues concerned with the implementation. The result has been
that there have been considerable delays and dissatisfaction in the donor community as
a consequence of this poor performance. If a sector programme could be carried out free
of all practical problems, it is assumed to be much more efficient.
The monitoring of a sector programme is understood as 'continuous self-assessment
process during programme implementation by the implementors mainly serving day-to-
day management purposes; focuses on efficiency, effectiveness (and impacts)' (Oksanen
and Lönnqvist 1998: 11). The evaluation is an assessment of a programme, carried out
independently by parties not involved in the every day management of the programme
with main focus on effects and impacts of the programme. Noonan (1997, iii) reports
that there is substantial variation in the extent to which standard government reporting
systems are used. Most international development agencies have their own guidelines
for monitoring (Oksanen and Lönnqvist 1998: 13). In addition to reliability and
availability of information, there would seem to be problems with decentralization
reforms. According to Noonan, it becomes an important issue at which level the support
is given. The financing process is described in more detail in the next section.
The monitoring and reporting process includes progress monitoring, sustainability
monitoring and compatibility with donor policies and priorities. The progress
monitoring is based on the programme framework and follow-up to targets defined as
key issues in a programme. Sustainability monitoring is usually carried out in the annual
reporting of a programme. This monitoring includes factors such as policy support,
technology used, impacts on the environment, gender and socio-economic issues,
assessment of capacity of the institutions and financial sustainability of the programme.6
The compatibility is included in some donor countries in the project or programme
annual reporting requirements, meaning that the programme follows the guidelines of
the donor country.
It is not surprising that the monitoring and evaluation aspects are complex in a sector
investment programme. For instance, the ASIP in Zambia involves over a dozen of
donor agencies with as many monitoring practices. Regarding evaluation, it seems that
this is the area where more common practices can be achieved. Perhaps this is also one
of the areas in which a fast harmonization of existing practices could be achieved, if
suitable negotiation framework was established.
In principal, many of the problems with monitoring and evaluation process accumulate
to financing as well. Book-keeping practices within Ministries can be rather careless
and the staff responsible for the administration of the funds seldom has high degrees in
business and administration. The need for technical assistance has been a high priority
in the past. The demands to reduce the amount of technical assistance are based on the
aid ownership and capacity building arguments but often it has been the case that the aid
management has been supervised by ex-patriots.
In addition, many problems with sector investments have their origins in the financing
process of the programmes. Based on traditions, each donor has applied an individual
coordination procedure, which satisfies their domestic auditing systems. In the case of
ASIP in Zambia, there has been considerable disagreement and dissatisfaction on the
part of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the donor community. On
behalf of the Ministry, concern has been on the fact the donors have not given up their
original demands. Furthermore, it has been argued that the disbursements should not
necessarily go through the Ministry of Finance bodies (route 1 in Figure 1) but through
sector bodies. This argument is based on the fact that the Ministry of Finance lacks
capacity to administrate the funds effectively (MAFF 1998: 55-56). If the Ministry of
Finance is in charge of the funds, it would mean that the Ministry of Agriculture, Food
and Fisheries would receive a portion of the sector investment funds at each level of
administration according to the programme expenditure plan.
Using the Ministry of Finance as a disbursement channel is justified if we consider this
as part of the national planning process. Sector programmes do have a component of the
national expenditure, meaning that some of the funding must come from the Ministry of
Finance. In this respect, donor disbursements could become part of the national budget
and spent according to the sector investment plan. In principle, this should not be
harmful to optimal implementation since the expenditure has been decided within the
responsible Ministry.
Very often it is the case that the responsible ministries control the aid expenditure,
which would be the route 2 in the Figure. In this arrangement, the aid expenditure
would be received by MAFF and allocated to different levels of the Ministry according
to the programme expenditure plan. This would also make it possible to reallocate some
of the funds in the case of unexpected need to reformulate the ASIP framework. Finally,
route 3 in the figure refers to the common situation in the project type of aid
administration. Here, the expenditure is allocated from individual donors to the final
users at different administrative levels. Such practices can also take place under a sector
investment programme but they are against the principle of basket funding and do not
create harmonized expenditure and management systems.7
Figure 1
Alternative disbursement channels (Lister 1997: 76)
Route 1 Route 2 Route 3
(via Finance bodies) (via Sector bodies) (direct)
Experiences from other sector programmes show that moving to basket funding should
be stated as a long-term objective, as it is most likely difficult to achieve in the early
stages of the programme. During the sector investment programme development,
emphasis should be put on development of financial management and reporting
systems. To overcome these programmes, MAFF report (1998: 56) suggests areas
subject to special interest:
· Common rules on the use and management of technical assistance
· Common rules on arrangements for paying supplementation or allowances to
government staff
· Establishment of joint review procedures
· Harmonization of common reporting systems and timetables
· Use of common expenditure programming formats and
· More modest pilot basket funding arrangements for particular activities
Although the list represents experiences from the ASIP in Zambia, these findings bear
common features of sector investment financing. Moving towards a more harmonized
system of financing is in line with the monitoring and evaluation process development.
However, the physical obstacle to development is in many cases difficult to avoid, in the
form of undereducated staff at the recipient organization. Thus, it has become
increasingly important to combine sector investments with capacity building exercises









4 Sector investment expenditure in Zambian agriculture: background
4.1 Political environment in Zambia
The Government of Zambia (GoZ) has been a dominant factor in the economy. If the
Government wishes to actively increase the income equality, interference with the
agricultural producer prices may provide substantial improvement in this respect.
However, the historical evidence has not supported this policy choice. More or less, the
agricultural sector has been exploited to collect revenues or to support urban consumers.
In a country rich with natural resources and ability to invest, it is difficult to understand
why the agricultural sector development has been modest. Agriculture plays a central
role in the development because a large part of the income in poor countries is related to
the agricultural production. If it is in the governments' interest to increase the welfare of
the people, strategies should focus on increasing the productivity in agriculture and then
the market prices for products sold (Gillis et al. 1992, 488).
The Government of Zambia has not been very successful in decentralizing the
administration. More or less, the ministries located in Lusaka have been responsible for
aid administration and practices. Following the principle of basket funding, this may not
necessarily be a negative issue. However, unless the needs are recorded from the bottom
up, the success of a sector investment programme is questionable. In this respect, there
remains a need to decentralize management and evaluation skills.
It is striking that Zambia has always had an unfilled potential in agricultural production.
Like its other natural resources, the country has land and human resources, yet it has
been unable to provide sufficient food supplies to satisfy the increasing domestic
demand. Despite the growing investments in extension services and the farmer support,
the overall performance has remained poor. This is linked with the fact that the
investments in general have been poorly targeted in Zambia. The revenues from copper
exports were invested in non-profitable ways, for instance in infrastructure to support
the copper mining industry, leaving the economic conditions unchanged (Nokkala
1997). The impacts of these neglects show in the review of agricultural sector
development, presented in the following section.
4.2 Agricultural production in Zambia
The Government has not supported agriculture in the past, more or less the sector has
been exploited by collecting revenues from the export earnings. However, the
macroeconomic policy has changed dramatically in the 1990s. First, the Government
decided not to follow a World Bank Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) but later
after a change in the political leadership led to pursue these policies again. One of the
conditionalities for SAP continuation was a removal of trade barriers, both for imports
and exports. Zambia has followed these objectives and, as a consequence, it is one of
the most open economies in the world. This is perhaps opening new opportunities for
the GoZ to intervene in the agricultural markets. As this study shows, the
macroeconomic impacts of public expenditure on agriculture can be substantial.9
The important role of agriculture in Zambia is illustrated by the fact that of the total
population, 60 per cent earn their income from the agricultural production (Talvela et al.
1997, 15). The number is even higher in the northern part of Zambia, where more than
80 per cent of the population belongs to the agricultural sector. The majority is peasant
households (Table 2).
In the colonial period there were restrictions to moving into towns from the rural areas.
When these restrictions were no longer in effect, there was a huge migration to urban
areas in Zambia. The share of urban population doubled from 20.5 per cent in 1963 to
40.9 per cent in 1980, and has continued to rise in the 1990s. The simultaneous increase
in the urban consumption and the decrease in rural production growth made it
impossible to sustain self-sufficiency in the food production. This led to an increase in
the imports, worsening the international currency reserves. Such development has
created pressures to market the domestic products in order to reduce the need for
imports (Chiluvumbo 1992, 50).
Zambia is 750,000 square kilometers in area, with a total population of nearly 10
million. Within the country, the agricultural conditions vary, from the rainfall averages
of 1200 mm/a in the north to 700 mm/a in the south and south-west. The quality of soil
is generally poor, only less than 60 per cent of the arable area is good for the cultivation.
The climate varies from the dry season between April and November to the rainy season
from November to March (Talvela et al. 1997, 14).
There are 700,000 to 800,000 farming units in Zambia, classified in to four different
units (Talvela et al. 1997, 16):
· Large scale commercial farms with more than 40 hectares of arable land,
totalling 700 in number, situated near rail lines and using modern production
techniques;
· Medium-scale commercial farms with 10 to 40 hectares of arable land;
· Small-scale semi-commercial farms with one to 10 hectares of arable land; and
· Traditional subsistence farmers with cultivated area less than 2.5 hectares,
totalling 600,000.
Table 2
Population growth in Zambia, rural and urban population, millions of people
(FAOSTAT Agricultural database)
Year 1964 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Total population 3,614 4,189 4,841 5,738 6,410 7,239 8,193
Urban 843 1,264 1,686 2,285 2,624 3,038 3,525
Rural 2,771 2,925 3,155 3,453 3,786 4,201 4,66810
The British South African Company, which initially ruled Zambia until 1926, and the
Northern Rhodesia Government were both concerned with minerals and settling farmers
to engage in the crop and cattle farming. Taxation policies led to a situation where it
was impossible to start small-scale farming activities. The only option available was to
work in the mines. The settler farmers promoted their products to be consumed by the
mine workers, which stagnated the village production as it was considered to be more
profitable to sell the labour inputs elsewhere instead of village agriculture. Thus, in the
colonial period the development of agriculture in Zambia was almost equal to the
development of commercial farming (Chiluvumbo 1992, 48).
The agricultural production Zambia can be divided into two subsectors: the commercial
and the noncommercial agriculture. These two sectors are also separated in the social
accounting matrix for Zambia, presented in section 5. The noncommercial agriculture
has been almost exclusively based on food crops, namely maize, cassava, sorghum,
groundnuts, beans and millet. The commercial agriculture has focused on more
commercial crops: coffee, tea, sugar cane, wheat, seed maize, soyabeans, tobacco, beef
cattle, dairy cattle and pigs. In the commercial agriculture, the producers can be further
distinguished into two categories, private farms and state parastatal estates. The number
of the latter has decreased over the last years as a consequence of privatisation efforts of
the Government of Zambia. Most of the commercial farmers are white, and their
contribution to Zambian marketed crops has been substantial, around 40 per cent for
maize and beef (Chiluvumbo 1992, 43).
In the early 1980s, the government launched efforts to release the agricultural potential
of the northern areas of Zambia. The overall objective was to secure national supply of
maize, thus Zambia experienced 'a maize boom'. The promotion of maize supported by
subsidised credit and inputs, extension services, marketing support, and raised producer
prices. The marketing of maize was arranged through cooperatives and new maize
varieties were developed by the national research agency. The strategy engaged more
small farms into maize production. However, by the beginning of 1990s, the maize
boom was already history. Reasons for this were mainly its economic unsustainability,
due to high production costs in small farms, and also the market integration of small
farms. Most of these farms are situated in roadless rural areas, so the logistics of
supplying the markets became costly and difficult (Kokwe 1997, 36-78).
As it should be noted, the access to land has not been the major problem of the land
ownership. As said before, there are large commercial farms but also a vast
noncommercial production of agricultural products. The noncommercial farming suffers
from the lack of access to relevant technology, inputs, training and credit. These factors
contribute to the low revenues from the small scale farming activities (Chiluvumbo
1992, 44-45). The land use has traditionally been based on chitemane, a shifting
cultivation system that requires large amounts of wood biomass for crop production.
The system has low carrying capacity of population per hectare, meaning that the
capacity limit has been exceeded in most areas where chitemane has been used. In order
to avoid deforestation there have been attempts to illegalize the chitemane system
(Holden 1996, 4). The yields per hectare have been low, 3 bags of maize (90 kg per bag)
per hectare have been produced. This is low compared to the 51,7 bags in the
Commercial Agriculture (Chiluvumbo 1992, 43).
In the colonial era, the agricultural sector was under heavy control, leading to large
scale commercial farming, mostly run by the ex-patriots. This led to infrastructure11
development in the favour of large farms and the sector was mainly neglected in the
development strategies. Since the independence in 1964, the Government of Zambia has
been heavily involved in the agricultural sector development. The policy choice
between small-scale peasant farming and large commercial farms was decided in the
favour of peasant farms, as the policies were humanistic at that time. President Kaunda
had hoped that participation by the masses would increase the total production and
improve the living conditions in the rural areas. The participation was promoted, for
instance, via cooperative movements (Kokwe 1997). Other programmes included large-
scale state production units (parastatals), collective ranches, intensive development
zones and intensive rural development programmes. The exports of agricultural
production were subject to taxation, as a part of national strategy.
The collapse of copper export earnings forced the government to seek for alternative
sources of economic development. Export crop oriented policy was formulated in the
late 1970s, and some success was achieved with tobacco, cotton, and particularly sugar.
The revenue gains remained modest, partly because the large investors were not
interested in investing into these products (Talvela et al. 1997, 19).
One of the key policies over the decades has been to guarantee the availability of low-
priced food to the poor urban population. The target of supplying consumers with food
products was carried out promoting maize cultivation. This policy decision had a
number of implications: First, technology was developed to hybrid maize varieties. This
led to distortions among the producers, favouring the large farms. Second, the supply of
inputs was heavily subsidized in order to secure the production capacity. Third, while
maize production was promoted, other traditional varieties were neglected, such as
cassava and millet. Finally, the policy was very consumer-oriented: The focus was on
providing the cheap food to urban population, leaving the producers to come up with
strategies to supply the sufficient amount (Talvela et al. 1997, 16-17).
The agriculture pricing policy was based on the principle of equal pricing, which meant
that the prices were kept at the same level nation-wide. This principle reflected the
ruling party UNIPs statement: One Zambia, one nation. Economically, this policy was
inefficient, leading to misallocation of resources and foregone production possibilities.
The equal price did not reflect the real costs of production. This policy was maintained
until the late 1980s, when the liberalization policies led to price differentiation (Talvela
et al. 1997, 19).
Looking at the figures for agricultural production, Table 3 provides information
regarding the gross agricultural production, food production, cereal production and crop
production over the same time period. Especially the fluctuation in the value of cereal
production is considerable over the years.12
Table 3
Gross agricultural production value data 1964-1995 1000 US$
(FAOSTAT Agriculture database)
1964 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Agriculture 289,2 327,9 483,6 428,4 476,2 540,0 544,8
Food 270,8 317,7 471,8 413,5 456,5 516,3 514,4
Crop 193,3 202,3 324,6 247,8 302,2 336,1 316,6
Cereals 109,7 97,9 203,4 123,4 150,0 153,2 113,2
The government of Zambia was heavily involved with the agricultural sector
development, as can be seen from the policy decisions. Until the early 1980s the
agricultural marketing was carried out by NAMBOARD, a government organization
founded for the promotion of agriculture. NAMBOARD was organized according to the
functional model of the colonial Maize Control Board. At some stages NAMBOARD
was the biggest employer in Zambia. The organization was accused of being inefficient
and it was closed down in 1981. Its functions were mainly taken over by the
cooperatives. These cooperatives were not supported only for the agricultural sector
policies but also because of political reasons. Similar accusations as in the case of
NAMBOARD emerged relatively soon after the shift to cooperatives. Finally, the
marketing activities were returned to NAMBOARD in 1985 (Talvela et al. 1997, 19).
The first big step towards the market liberalisation was taken in September 1990, when
the cooperative monopoly on the maize trade was abolished (Kokwe 1997, 1). In 1991,
the rest of the monopolies in agribusiness were abolished as well. Liberalization policies
allowed private companies to enter the agricultural markets. The principle of the
markets was that inputs were allowed to purchase from any seller and the output could
be sold to any buyer. Despite the rapid progress in the liberalization the knowledge of
free market functioning remained poor (Talvela et al. 1997, 20). The aims of the
agricultural market liberalisation were to develop an efficient and effective agricultural
marketing and processing system, to develop a more efficient input supply system and
to develop agricultural sector exports (IESR 1998, 13).
As it can be derived from the policy choices in the past, the development process has
been weakened by the lack of consistent policy framework. The shift from the
government controlled agricultural markets to liberalized markets has been problematic
as the government has needed to reorient its strategy. There has not been private interest
in developing the agricultural sector in the past, due to the state subsidies and parastatal
organizations. In the absence of private organizations to take over the former state
functions in marketing and distribution, it has been very difficult to fully justify the
government completely withdrawing from the provision of services (Gould 1998, 54-
55).
Rural policies in Zambia have been a part of the national policy since the 1950s. The
rural policy has been practised in periodical campaigns, under which rural development
projects have been implemented. The objectives of these policies have been ill-defined
and the policies have been limited to agricultural targets but excluded income, nutrition13
and access to services. It can be concluded that there is a substantial need to improve the
rural policies (Talvela et al. 1997, 17).
Policies and their effectiveness under ASIP must be reviewed using the information
given in this section. Chiluvumbo (1992, 48-51) has listed a number of reasons for the
poor performance of the agricultural sector in Zambia. In his opinion, the key issues
have been:
· Colonial heritage
· Post-independence policies and implementation
· Population distribution
· Production by the masses
· Unfavourable political environment
When compared with crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, listed by Ghai and Smith in the first
part of this section, we can see that there are similarities to regional problems, thus
indicating that the situation in Zambia is not different from the overall situation in the
region. Perhaps the production by the masses can be classified as the Zambian
speciality, although such booms in the production of special crop(s) have appeared also
elsewhere. It will be interesting to see how the ASIP curriculum corresponds to the
former targets or whether new targets have been chosen.
5 Effects of sector investment expenditure on household income
5.1 Scenarios of ASIP implementation
Sector investments as a tool of national fiscal policy are studied using the evidence from
Zambian ASIP. Different policy scenarios were created to simulate different
expenditure patterns and also the effects of low expenditure levels contrasted with the
high expenditure levels.
The policy analysis were carried out using a social accounting matrix constructed for
Zambia. The base year of the SAM is 1995. Four scenarios were created:
· the actual implementation scenario
· the optimal implementation scenario
· the full expenditure on noncommercial agriculture scenario and
· the half expenditure on commercial agriculture and half on noncommercial
agriculture scenario
The effects of these expenditure patterns were contrasted with respect to income effects
and household labour supply. The description of each scenario is given in the following
sections.14
Certain limitations of a SAM must be taken into consideration when the policy
experiments are evaluated. First of all, the SAM used in this study is not based on a
coherent data from input-output tables. This means that additional consistancy checks
have been needed. Second, the SAM has a rather small number of accounts. Therefore,
it has set limitations to the level of analysis. This means that although we can identify
linkages between different sectors and institutions, there may be specific linkages at a
more detailed level of disaggregation that could be of interest. However, these are not
captured in the matrix. Finally, in the analysis to follow, it should be stressed that the
results presented are on the 'other things remain constant' basis. This means that the
outcomes of the scenarios, even the one based on actual expenditure under the
argicultural sector investment programme, hardly reflect the reality in the end of 1997.
This is because no additional measures under the structural adjustment programme, no
Government expenditure on other sectors or any technological progress or increase in
the volume of exports were taken into account.
5.2 The actual implementation scenario
The actual implementation could represent a base line scenario for analyses of the
alternatives to what actually occurred in the period 1996-97. In other words, this could
be the point of comparison for other development strategies, such as the optimal
implementation scenario.
The assumption in this scenario is that the funds were directed more towards the
commercial farms of Zambia, which in fact have been the ones benefiting from the
export-oriented policies. Although it is clear that small scale farmers have also gained
some of the support, it is likely that these farms also have access to market services. It is
against this background the scenario is based on the insertion of the funds to the
commercial agriculture.
For the actual implementation scenario, the expenditure in US dollars was given by the
real expenditure under the ASIP framework. Gould (1998, 63) presented data on
expenditures, which was used for the insertions of current price US$, as reported in
Table 4.
Table 4










1996 19,7 11,8 31,5 1100 34,650
1997 30* 55* 85 1200 93,500
Total 49,7 66,8 116,5 128,150
*= estimates based on project documents15
These figures were further converted to 1995 prices using a composite index of the
retail prices in Zambia as a deflator (IMF 1999, 11). This gave a total impact of K 88
billion as a the actual ASIP implementation over the two years.
5.3 The optimal implementation scenario
This scenario represents the optimal use of ASIP programme funds if they had been
subject to disbursements according to the original implementation plan. Thus, this
means the insertion of the funds proposed in the ASIP documents in full. The difference
in magnitude is considerable if contrasted with the actual implementation scenario. In
this scenario, we can assume that the government has been interested in increasing the
agricultural production rather than focusing on the social problems. The expenditure
data is presented in Table 5.
Again, the US$ amounts were converted to 1995 Kwacha using the same deflator as in
the case of the actual implementation scenario. This resulted in the expenditure of K173
billion over the two years.
It is very easy to see that this level of expenditure will produce results that are quite
different from the previous scenario. Although the expenditure pattern is the same as in
the actual implementation scenario, the absolute amount of expenditure is much higher
in this scenario, the total difference was K85 billion. With the fixed multipliers this
automatically means that the effects will be proportional to the expenditure levels.
5.4 The full expenditure on noncommercial agriculture scenario
Having followed the most likely expenditure patterns of the ASIP funding in the first
two scenarios, the third scenario has a different starting point. This scenario represents
an alternative, according to which the total programme expenditure in ASIP would be
directed to the noncommercial agriculture. As the multipliers have shown, this would
mean higher increase in the income of the Unskilled Rural Households.
Table 5










1996 29,6 69,2 98,8 1100 108,680
1997 35 100 135 1200 162,000
Total 64,4 169,2 233,6 270,68016
Here, the agricultural policy is used as a policy instrument in a sense that it would be
aimed at alleviating rural poverty. The policy would focus both at income distribution
and the development of small-scale farming activities, which were previously
undermined in the agricultural policy. Basically, the concern of the government would
be the food security through increased production of food crops as opposed to the
starting point of the actual and optimal implementation strategies. Also, this policy
would be supporting the Harris-Todaro-model results, leading to an increase in the rural
income level, and creating disincentives to move to urban areas.
This is an unlikely expenditure pattern because of its political infeasibility. However, it
would represent the governments' efforts to develop rural regions and to direct concrete
transfers to the poorest share of the population, the rural households working in
noncommercial agricultural production. The figures for full disbursement in 1996-97,
US$ 153,8 million, were allocated to the noncommercial agriculture to illustrate the
effects of a full scale programme focusing on rural income generation. However, it
should be kept in mind that such a programme may also generate more economic
activity in the marginal areas. This would increase demand for extension and input
services. This type of a policy package would clearly aim at solving some of the
problems in income distribution and net migration from the rural areas. Otherwise, it is
very unlikely that the government of Zambia could suddenly promote the rural areas
through such a comprehensive support package.
5.5 The half-half expenditure scenario
This last scenario represents a division of the total programme expenditure between
noncommercial agriculture and commercial agriculture on equal basis. This means that
the respective expenditures on the commercial and the noncommercial agriculture
would be US$ 176,9 million, equivalent to the totals in the two previous scenarios. This
means that a shock equivalent to US$ 88,45 million was inserted as a single shock to
both sectors.
This scenario would represent a strategy focusing on income distribution, preventing the
migration to urban areas and an increase in the productivity. This scenario may also
include some real life elements, as it seems like a plausible assumption that at least
some of the ASIP expenditure would have been directed to the noncommercial
agriculture. This was already explained earlier when the two-fold strategies for
agriculture were discussed. However, the scenario has no similarity with the real
expenditure since there were no basis to determine which portion of the funds should go
to the noncommercial agriculture in these scenarios.
According to ASIP planning documents, there has been a focus both on the public and
private sector projects with roughly equal expenditure of the donor funds. This is not
directly indicating a relationship between the expenditure on the commercial or on the
noncommercial agriculture. As it turns out, the public sector projects have been
financed through the multilateral donor institutions whereas the private sector activities
have been financed by the bilateral donors. This also inherited from the project-based
funding era, when the cooperation partnerships were established through NGOs and
private institutions. It could be interpreted in the context that the activities focusing on
the broad development of the rural areas would be financed from the public sector17
finance scheme. However, due to the political nature of ASIP funding, such a
conclusion cannot be binding.
5.6 Results from the policy experiments
In this section the scenarios are compared in terms of their income effects on the
unskilled rural households. Table 6 shows the effects of the four policy experiments on
the unskilled rural households. The difference between the best outcome of scenarios
and any other given scenario is also shown in the last column of the table. Not
surprisingly, the difference is greatest in the case of the actual implementation scenario,
which has the smallest expenditure as opposed to the other scenarios, which utilise a
greater amount of funds.
It can be seen that the difference between the actual implementation and the full
expenditure on noncommercial agriculture is over ten per cent in the total value of the
increase in unskilled rural household income. If measured in Kwacha billion, the actual
implementation scenario produces less than one fourth of the increase provided by the
noncommercial agriculture scenario. Regarding the possible case in which the full
implementation would have led to allocating some of the funds to noncommercial
agriculture, the results are not too different between the three scenarios using the
planned expenditure figures. The difference between the optimal implementation
scenario and the mixed expenditure scenario would have been only less than two per
cent, as would have been the difference between the mixed strategy and the
noncommercial agriculture.
So far we have been concerned with the income effects of different policy experiments.
Another issue worth examining is the labour supply decision of the households,
especially those in the rural areas. How do these policies stimulate the employment
opportunities for rural households? It is clear that an increase in the supply of labour
should take place if the expenditure in agriculture increases considerably, thus
demanding more resources to the agricultural production in the rural areas.
Table 6
A comparison of policy experiment effects on the rural unskilled household income
Policy experiment Effect on unskilled
rural households, %






Actual 6,8 52,74 11,5
Optimal 13,4 103,68 4,9
Noncommercial 18,3 142,35 -
Half-half 15,9 123,73 2,418
To see if this has been the case, Table 7 provides a comparison of changes in the
unskilled rural labour supply. If policies were targeted towards the noncommercial
agriculture, there would be an increase in the demand for unskilled rural labour. Even
when the expenditure level in the noncommercial agriculture experiment is considerably
higher than in the case of the actual implementation scenario, the difference in demand
for urban labour remains almost the same. This indicates that policies focusing on small
scale farming activities would have little effects on the labour demand in the urban areas
whereas the effects on the local supply of labour would be considerably higher.
However, it is interesting to see that the optimal implementation of ASIP would have
had the greatest impact on the urban labour supply as well. The effect on the skilled
urban labour would have been an increase of more than 18 per cent. This again seems
like an indicator of the land ownership linkages. The results presented show that there
are considerable differences not only between the results provided by the use of two
expenditure levels but also when the expenditure is targeted differently.
7 Conclusions
This paper has provided a rethinking of the benefits of public expenditure on sector
investments in Africa. From the national authorities' point of view, sector investments
can be an important source of foreign currency, which is needed to balance the
governments' foreign reserves. On the downside, when a programme is not running
according to programme documents and expectations, withdrawals and delays in
disbursements can lead to serious fiscal problems. This is especially the case in
countries which run on cash budget, which means that possibilities to shift resources
from one ministry to another are limited. Incidently, many countries running sector
investment programmes also operate on cash budget.
Regarding the impacts of sector investment programmes on national economy, the
direct and indirect economy-wide effects should be taken into consideration instead of
only the primary effects on the sector itself. This study utilized a social accounting
matrix for Zambia. The advantage of using a SAM in the analysis instead of input-
output framework has been that the effects on the household income have been
captured. The result is that the policies aimed at promoting agricultural production do
have a significant income generation effect as well. The findings in this paper suggest
Table 7
Unskilled rural labour supply in policy experiments
Policy experiment Effect on Unskilled
rural labour %
Effect on the Unskilled




Actual 10,1 23,31 9,4
Optimal 19,9 45,8 18,5
Noncommercial 26,1 60,2 11,7
Half-half 23,1 53,3 15,219
that agricultural sector investments may promote growth and reduce poverty. The
findings are important in the sense that if the government wishes to achieve growth with
the consideration of income distribution at the same time, these goals can be met
through a single sector policy. This is true especially in the cases where the funds are
allocated not only to commercial agricultural production but also to noncommercial
production.
Empirical evidence from Zambia shows no significant attempt to integrate sector
investments to a broader national public expenditure strategy. However, the evidence
presented here is from the agricultural sector in Zambia only. This suggests there is a
need for further research. Similar policy analysis should be carried out in other sectors
and countries as well, to see if the findings of this study could be observed elsewhere.
As sector investments contribute to national budget in a substantial way in many
countries, a more thorough review of the fiscal impacts is needed to arrive to
conclusions that bear universal meaning.20
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